Summary. This paper analyzes valuation and pricing of physical electricity delivery contracts.
Introduction
The notions of arbitrage and market completeness are cornerstones of modern nance, in particular for the valuation of nancial contracts. Essentially, a nancial market is arbitrage free if and only if there exists a (local) martingale measure and an arbitrage free market is complete if and only if there exists a unique martingale measure. See e.g. [7, 8] for more detailed statements and proofs. At complete markets every contingent claim is attainable by hedging portfolios, and nancial derivatives can be priced by calculating the expected discounted value of the derivatives payo w.r.t. the unique martingale measure.
At incomplete markets, not every contingent claim can be attained. Still, under no-arbitrage one can calculate the minimal and the maximal discounted expectation under all expectations w.r.t. any equivalent martingale measure, which gives the lower and upper arbitrage boundary. This often leads to a large interval of possible prices. If the analyzed security is traded at an exchange, one can try to estimate a market price of risk, which leads to a price within the arbitrage bounds.
For contracts that are traded OTC this is not possible because data are not available. Several methods for nding reasonable prices have been developed so far, e.g. good deal bounds [6] , local risk minimization [16] or convex hedging [21] . Such approaches search for martingale measures with restricted or minimal risk, where the notion of risk is dierent for each approach.
In the present paper we move on from the sphere of purely nancial markets and analyze OTC electricity delivery contracts from the viewpoint of an electricity producer. Electricity markets are typically incomplete markets with unique frictions, not existent at nancial markets: In particular electricity is produced from fuels but can not be converted back to fuels. Electricity also can not be stored in large quantities. Furthermore, all kinds of physical storage and production restrictions are relevant for the production process. Therefore, and because produced and used electric power is balanced immediately in an electrical network, dierences between demanded and produced power may lead to damaged equipment or even breakdown of the net. Some parts of electricity markets, in particular futures markets, are organized like nancial markets, but even in this case the delivery proles of traded futures can not fully replicate any OTC-traded delivery prole.
We start with an analysis of arbitrage and ask the question: Given the above frictions, how can we characterize arbitrage in a simple market model with electricity production? In particular we search for an analogon to equivalent martingale measures, when looking at prices for fuel and electricity instead of prices for nancial securities.
We then proceed to valuation and pricing of delivery contracts. When valuating a specied contract (with a stochastic process of deliveries and a xed delivery price) the producer may look at the smallest up-front payment (or cash-reserve) such that all contractual obligations can be Institute of Statistics and Mathematical Methods in Economics, Vienna University of Technology, Austria.
satised at the given delivery price, and the asset value (consisting of cash and the value of fuel) at the end of the planning horizon is for sure not negative. This approach resembles what in a nancial context is called superhedging and therefore we speak of the superhedging value. In similar manner, we analyze the smallest delivery price such that, starting with an asset value of zero, all contractual obligations can be fullled with a nonnegative end value. Superhedging prices are not market prices (the same is true for superhedging values and market values) but mark an important boundary: if delivery is agreed at smaller prices, the producer denitely has to take some risk. The costs of completely removing the risk related to a smaller price can be calculated as the related superhedging value.
Superhedging values and superhedging prices are dependent on the production equipment but independent of any preferences. However they may be very strict boundaries for feasible upfront payments or delivery prices, because any risk is eliminated. In practical situations, producers usually take some risk in order to achieve potentially higher prot. We therefore also analyze the smallest start capital leading to an acceptable distribution of the end value as well as the smallest delivery price that leads to an acceptable end distribution when starting with zero capital. In the rst case we speak of the capital requirement. The delivery price in the second case will be called the acceptability price.
In the present paper we restrict the analysis to concave acceptability functionals [20] , which are (up to sign) closely related to coherent risk measures [2] . Furthermore, we consider stochastic processes and optimization in discrete time, which is the usual approach taken by energy producers in practice. Similar methods have been applied to purely nancial portfolios e.g. in [14] and [10] , where it was shown that classical results on no-arbitrage pricing can be replicated in a discrete time, discrete state space stochastic optimization framework. In particular dual formulations can be used to characterize no-arbitrage and to derive the classical risk-free pricing results and arbitrage bounds. While those papers builds on discretized state spaces, the present work uses general state spaces. T. Pennanen in [17, 18] analyzes superhedging in a very general framework but again focuses on nancial markets. In addition, [19] derives basic facts of capital requirements and acceptability pricing (in particular indierence pricing, see remark 3.3 below) in the context of convex analysis, again in a purely nancial context. The present paper builds on the views expressed in those papers and uses convex analysis and duality theory but focuses on the case of electricity markets. It aims at deriving concrete no-arbitrage conditions and pricing principles in the complex situation with storage and production restrictions (like random outages of generators), asymmetric production possibilities between fuel and electricity and nonstorability of electricity.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 uses a basic optimization problem to derive and analyze no-arbitrage conditions for a model with spot prices for fuel and electricity, when electricity can be produced with given eciency. In the main part, section 3, the optimization problem of a minimum up-front payment for a delivery contract is used to derive valuation formulas in terms of stochastic discount factors and equivalent measures. As a second application we analyze the smallest feasible delivery price. In both cases we aim at almost surely nonnegative end value. Finally we relax this requirement and consider the minimum capital requirement and the acceptability price.
The last section, 4, concludes the paper.
No-Arbitrage Conditions
In the following all relevant risk factors (in particular prices) and the related decisions are considered as stochastic processes, dened on a ltered probability space Y = Ω, F, F = {F t } t≥0 , P in discrete time t = 0, 1, . . . , T . For simplicity this setup assumes constant time increments, e.g. hours, days or weeks. However, all following statements can easily be adapted to more general time models. Time zero represents here and now and the related σ-algebra F 0 is the trivial σ-algebra F 0 = {∅, Ω}. Time T denotes the end of the planning horizon. In order to simplify notation we use the sets T = {0, 1, . . . , T }, T 0 = {0, 1, . . . , T − 1}, T 1 = {1, . . . , T } and T
In the simplest model the basic risk factors are fuel prices and electricity prices, represented by real valued stochastic processes X f t (ω) and X e t (ω), both adapted to the ltration F. In fact, fuel prices are assumed to be almost surely nonnegative, whereas electricity prices may take also negative values with positive probability. Both, fuel and electricity are measured in MWh and prices are given in currency units per MWh. Note that it is not assumed that the ltration F is generated by the price processes X f t and X e t . Additional information like prices of further fuels, weather, or general business activity may play a role.
Consider now a producer, using a generator (e.g. a turbine) with eciency η. For simplicity we measure both, electric energy and quantities of fuel (the related energy content) in MWh. We also use the notation R = (1 + r) The decision processes y t and z t as well as the decision processes c t and s t are considered as real valued random processes dened on Y and are adapted to the ltration F. This means that decisions at time t have to rely on information available at time t. Furthermore, fuel z t is bought at time t at a known price X f t . On the other hand we assume that electricity production over the period [t, t + 1] is planned in advance at time t but the electricity price X e t+1 (currency units per MWh) at which the planned amount is sold is revealed only at the end, t+1, of the period. Keep in mind that c 0 , s 0 , y 0 , z 0 are deterministic, as F 0 is assumed to be the trivial σ-algebra. For physical reasons, electricity production and fuel storage are almost surely restricted to nonnegative values.
The basic setup will be extended when contractual delivery and delivery price are introduced.
For the moment however, we use it as it is to derive no-arbitrage conditions. Extending the usual denitions (see e.g. [4] denition 2.14, 2.15) we say that Denition 1. In the basic model a strategy {y t , z t } t≥0 with cash position c t and fuel storage s t , where y t , s t ≥ 0 is self nancing if the following conditions hold almost surely for all t ∈ T 1
At time t the value of a strategy is given by
is a self nancing strategy {y t , z t } t≥0 with
We call a market X e t , X f t η-arbitrage free, if no η-arbitrage exists. A market X e t , X f t is arbitrage free if it is η-arbitrage free for any 0 ≤ η ≤ η max , where η max denotes the maximum eciency available to the producers.
Clearly an η-arbitrage free market is η -arbitrage free for any η ≤ η.
Based on these denitions and assuming that c t , y t , s t and the products X f T s T and z t X f t are integrable, the following optimization problem can be used to detect arbitrage strategies. max y,z,c,s
subject to:
Remark 1. In order to avoid too much numbering, we may refer to parts of the contraint sets as contrain groups. As an example, the rst line of contraints in (2.6) will be referred to as constraint group 1.
The following observation is a key to characterizing η-arbitrage. The concept of η-arbitrage deserves some additional discussion. By weakening the notion of no-arbitrage we account for the fact that (depending on technical progress) arbitrage possibilities in the above sense may exist for very ecient (high η) generators, at least for some time. Two eects, in contrast to purely nancial markets, may prevent immediate or even quick return to a completely arbitrage free situation: First it is not possible to realize innite prots in reality, because production capacity y t and fuel storage s t are not only bounded to be nonnegative, but also restricted by some upper capacity of production and storage. Therefore prots are bounded as well. On the other hand, over time others might build similarly ecient generators as well and prot will fade away eventually. However this process will take some time, because investment costs are high and arbitrage prots are restricted by the production capacity and can be realized only gradually over time.
Given this argument for the concept of η-arbitrage, it might sound strange that test problem (2.6) is formulated without upper bounds on storage and production. However, because of positive homogeneity, a strategy which leads to a positive end value with positive probability can be scaled in a way such that either the scaled solution leads to an innite expectation without upper bounds or such that all upper bounds are observed and at least one upper bound is reached with positive probability at some point in time. Therefore for a pure test of η-eciency the upper bounds are not relevant.
Using test problem (2.6), it is now possible to derive general no-arbitrage conditions. Lemma 2. A market X e t , X f t is η-arbitrage free in the described setup if and only if there exist adapted stochastic processes {ξ t , λ t } with the following properties:
A1: For each t ∈ T 1 the random variables ξ t and λ t are essentially bounded. A2:
Proof. The Lagrangian of (2.6) is given by
where γ ≥ 0 is a real number, ζ ≥ 0 a F T -measurable essentially bounded random variable, ξ t and λ t are F t -measurable and essentially bounded.
After some reordering, (2.7) can be rearranged as follows:
Using (2.8), the tower property of conditional expectation and keeping in mind y t , s t ≥ 0, the dual function
L(y, z, c, s; ξ, λ, ζ, γ),
is bounded (in fact zero almost surely) if and only if the following conditions hold:
Hence, the dual problem is a pure feasibility problem and it follows that the original problem is 
if the fact that F 0 is the trivial σ-algebra is taken into account. From (2.10) and (2.11) we can infer ξ T ≥ 1 > 0. Applying (2.18) recursively and keeping in mind R > 0, it follows that ξ t > 0 (2.24)
for t ∈ T 1 . Immediately we get γ > 0
from (2.14).
Therefore it is possible to divide inequalities by γ without changing their direction. It follows that processes ξ and λ fulll the system (2.10)-(2.21) if and only if the processes ξ t = 
can be inferred from (2.34). Together this leads to
which is a tautology, given that R ≥ 1 and X f 0 are nonnegative. Lemma 2 can also be restated in probabilistic terms in the following way:
is η-arbitrage free if and only if there exist an equivalent measure Q and a process {λ t } with the following properties:
B1:
Assume that the market is η-arbitrage free. Hence there exist processes ξ , λ fullling conditions A1-A6 of Lemma 2. Dene now
Furthermore note that from (2.36) we can infer
by recursively applying property A3 and taking expectation. Immediately it follows from A2 and A3 that ξ t is a (almost surely) positive martingale and E P [ξ t ] = 1. Together this means that ξ t is a process of densities and we can construct an equivalent measure Q with density dQ dP = ξ T .
(2.39)
The equation 
which is B1.
In similar manner, starting with
we get
and therefore
i.e. property B4 of the Proposition.
Finally, property A6 of Lemma 2, E P λ t+1 |F t ≤ λ t is equivalent to
Applying property A3 of of Lemma 2 another time gives
and hence (again by the Bayes rule)
which is property B3.
For the converse start with a measure Q and a process λ fullling conditions B1-B4 of the Proposition. Then use the density of Q w.r.t. P, see (2.39), to dene a random variable ξ T and the positive martingale
as well as the processes
Using the same equivalent transformation as above one can show that ξ , λ fullls 1-6 of Lemma (2) if ξ, λ fullls B1-B4 of the Proposition.
B1 can be interpreted easily: under the equivalent measure Q the expected proceeds of selling one MWh of electricity at the end of the period must be less or equal to the compounded costs R η −1 X f t for producing one MWh electricity over the time period. Properties B2-B4 can be restated as λ t ≥ X f t together with B4: under the measure Q the discounted expectation of λ equals the fuel price and at each point in time λ is not less than the fuel price. In the light of (2.38) the conditions can be interpreted as no arbitrage conditions between the shadow price of storage and the fuel price. Moreover, conditions B2-B4 can be used to derive further properties of the fuel price under the measure Q:
f t is η-arbitrage free then there exists an equivalent measure such that B1 holds together with
Proof. From B3, B4 one can infer X f t ≤ λ t for t ∈ T 0 . Taking expectation and using B4 a second time leads to
In similar manner (2.40) can be derived for t = T − 1 from B2 and B4.
The necessary condition (2.41), in fact stating that the discounted fuel price must be a supermartingale under any feasible Q, ensures that the expected prot from storing fuel does not exceed the proceeds from immediately selling the fuel, if interest is taken into account.
The equivalent systems A1-A6 of Lemma 2 and B1-B4 of Proposition 1 include inequalities.
Depending on the processes X f t and X e t , those systems will not in general lead to unique solutions ξ t respectively Q. Moreover, keep in mind that Q is not required to be a martingale measure like in purely nancial models: neither the (discounted) fuel price, nor the electricity price are bounded to be martingales under Q. Nevertheless it can be shown that the existence of a martingale measure for the fuel price process together with consistency between fuel and electricity price is sucient for the exclusion of arbitrage.
Corollary 2. If there exists an equivalent measure Q such that B1 holds together with 42) then the market is η-arbitrage free.
Proof. B1 holds by assumption. Set λ t = X f t for all t. This choice fullls B2. Substituting λ t+1 for X f t+1 at the left side of (2.42) leads to B4. Finally, using the same substitution on both sides, and observing r > 0 leads to B3.
As a last remark in this section we note that Lemma 2 and Proposition 1 still hold (in the following sense), if several production units i ∈ {1, . . . , K} with dierent eciencies are used by market participants. If y i t denotes the energy produced by unit i and η i denotes the eciency of unit i it is possible to reformulate the basic accounting equations (2.1) and (2.2) as
which leads to a corresponding reformulation of the test problem (2.6). Analyzing the dual then leads to the following result.
Corollary 3. Let η max denote the largest production eciency available to market participants. Then the market is η-arbitrage free for any η i ≤ η max if and only if conditions A1-A6 (respectively B1-B4) hold for η = η max .
Proof. Taking the same steps as in the proof of Lemma (2), but ensuring boundedness for each y i t separately, the reformulated test problem leads to conditions A4':
Contract Pricing and Valuation
Consider now a delivery contract for electric energy, agreed between a producer and a customer and specied in the following way: the producer has the obligation to deliver an amount D t [MWh] of electric energy at a price of price K currency units per MWh over each period [t, t + 1], t ∈ T 0 . The demand D t is a stochastic process adapted to the ltration {F t } while K is a xed price, agreed in advance. Two natural questions arise, when designing the contract:
(1) What is the value of the contract, when the delivery price K is given.
(2) What is an adequate delivery price?
Given the no-arbitrage conditions derived above, in general there is little hope that a unique arbitrage free price (or valus) could be derived from a unique equivalent measure, even if the market is η-arbitrage free. Therefore, still taking into account the previously derived arbitrage conditions, we analyze valuation and pricing from the standpoint of a producer. A variant of the rst question then can be stated as: What is the minimum initial asset value or upfrontpayment V 0 = c 0 + s 0 X f 0 such that the producer is able to fulll all contractual obligations and the distribution of the asset value at the end of the planning horizon, i.e. V T = c T + s T X f T , still stays acceptable. The second question can be restated in similar manner: Given an asset value of zero at the beginning, what is the minimum delivery price K such that the producer is able to fulll all contractual obligations and the distribution of the asset value at the end of the planning horizon, i.e. V T = c T + s T X f T , still stays acceptable. Both, the minimum upfront payment and the minimum delivery price are not market prices or market values. However, when market value or market price exist and fall below the respective rms value or price, then the producer has to take some risk.
In the following we consider two types of acceptability. The rst interpretation requires that the asset value is almost surely not negative at the end. This strict approach is closely related to nancial superhedging and gives only a boundary on the price or value. In the second case, the producer measures acceptability by applying an acceptability functional (or a risk measure) to the end distribution and accepts only if the value exceeds some acceptability bound. In what follows, we call this approach acceptability pricing.
3.1. Superhedging and the minimum upfront payment. The basic setup is the same as in the previous section. However, in contrast to the pure no-arbitrage arguments, an individual producer can not neglect that its fuel storage and production capacity is restricted. So S will denote the upper bound on storage and P t is an {F t }-adapted process of upper bounds on the production of a generator with eciency η. While from a technical point of view the generator has a xed production capacity, the usage of an (adapted) process P t > 0 of production capacities allows for considering the eects of reserve-requirements or preferential demand, not related to the contract under consideration. Furthermore, random outages can be handled in this way. Throughout the following subsections we assume that the producer is a price-taker at both the fuel and the electricity market.
Because of the contractual obligations only parts of the produced energy y t can be sold at the electricity spot market after entering into the agreement. Moreover, it can be useful for the producer to buy electricity from the market in order to meet obligations, either because such trades are expected to be cheaper than producing or because the deliverable amount exceeds the production boundary. The amount of electricity sold at the market is an {F t }-adapted stochastic process of decisions that can take values in R and will be denoted by w t . If it is negative, this means that an amount of energy is bought.
The following optimization problem describes the decision of a producer with eciency η, trying to fulll the contractual obligations, i.e. delivery of amounts amounts of energy D t > 0 over the period (t, t 
Again, we assume that c t , y t , s t , z t X Note that under the contractual obligations the cash position develops according to
Here we assume that the delivery price K is payable at the end of each delivery period. Produced energy splits into energy traded at the market and contractual energy delivery, i.e. w t + D t = y t . Therefore the rst constraint of 3.1 follows by substituting y t − D t for w t in the basic cash equation
The pricing problem (3.1) and the no-arbitrage test problem (2.6) look quite dierent at rst glance. However it turns out that the related dual problems have quite similar constraints as the following Lemma shows.
Lemma 3. The Lagrange dual of the valuation problem (3.1) is given by
subject to
where ξ t ,λ t , µ t and ν t are essentially bounded and measurable w.r.t. F t .
Proof. The Lagrangian of (3.1) is given by
where ζ ≥ 0 is a F T -measurable random variable, and ξ t , λ t , µ t ≥ 0, ν t ≥ 0 are chosen F tmeasurable and essentially bounded.
After reordering, (3.4) yields L(y, z, c, s; ξ, λ, ζ, γ) =
The dual problem then reads max ξ,λ,µ,ν
where the constraints ensure that the Lagrange function min y≥0,z,c,s≥0 L(y, z, c, s; ξ, λ, ζ, γ) stays bounded.
Constraint group 3-6 of (3.6) already coincide with the constraint groups 2-5 of (3.3). Using ξ T = ζ ≥ 0 the multiplier ζ can be eliminated, which (using the rst line of constraints in (3.3)) leads to ξ T ≥ 0 and λ T + ν T ≥ X f T · ξ T . This resembles the rst line of constraints in (3.3). The second constraint of (3.6) can be reformulated as
, and taking into account ν t ≥ 0 shows that it is superuous.
Absence of η-arbitrage ensures feasibility and the existence of inner solutions of (3. Proof. A1-A6 of Lemma 2 denes a subset of the feasible set of (3.3). By absence of η-arbitrage the set dened by A1-A6 must be nonempty (Lemma (2)), which implies that the feasible set of (3.3) has nonempty interior. Observe now that starting with a feasible solution ξ t > 0, λ t > 0 and µ t = ν t = 0, it is always feasible to increase µ t and ν t , which means that the relative interior of the feasible set is not empty. Then V * 0 (K, D, η) = U * 0 (K, D, η) follows from strong duality. Remark 2. If the market is not η-arbitrage free, still (3.3) is the dual of (3.1). However, the arbitrage argument can not be used to ensure strong duality. Therefore, for all results based on equality between primal and dual optimal value, one has to nd other arguments for showing that the feasible set of (3.11) is nonempty. Alternatively one may try to base the argumentation on other constraint qualications.
Lemma 3, together with Corollary 4, shows that the process ξ ( actually the shadow price related to the cash position) can be interpreted as a process of stochastic discount factors applied to the opportunity costs of delivering at price K. The processes µ and ν valuate the available production and storage capacities. On the other hand, the process λ (the shadow price for storage accounting) seems to be harder to interprete. However, note that it is possible to derive the relation E P [λ t+1 |F t ] = ξ t X f t , which shows that the expectation of λ t+1 equals the (stochastically) discounted fuel price at time t.
If the market is η-arbitrage free, the minimum upfront payment can be calculated by the dual program. In this case the optimal multiplicators ξ, λ, µ and ν are interpretable as stochastic discount factors, applied to the processes X e t+1 − K D t , P t and −S. We can characterize them even more precisely: the relation
can be derived from the constraints of the dual program in the same way as (2.36) was derived from the no-arbitrage conditions. Furthermore, constraint groups three and ve of (3.3) implie
Finally, given the stochastic discount factors one can derive the following decomposition of the minimum upfront payment.
Corollary 5. If a market is η-arbitrage free, and given the stochastic discount factors ξ, λ, µ, ν the superhedging value can be decomposed as follows:
Proof. For η-arbitrage free market, corollary (4) can be applied. The assertion then can be obtained easily from the objective function of (3.3), by applying the relation Cov(X,
The rst termat the right hand side of (3.9) is the expected present value of a pure trader, fullling the contractual obligations by electricity bought at the market. Further expectation terms correct for the eects of (limited) storage and production outages. The rst covariance term can be interpreted as a risk loading for the pure trader, while the second covariance term is related to the eects of uncertain production capacities. Because the covariances may have any sign and the eects of production and storage are subtracted from the expectation, all kinds of contango and backwardation may arise.
From the objective function of (3.11) it can be seen that the minimum up-front payment increases with increasing demands D t and decreases with increasing delivery price K and with increasing capacities P t , S . is convex (separately) in K and in D.
Corollary 6. If the market X
Proof. Let F denote the (convex) set of feasible ξ, λ, µ, ν for formulation (3.12) and dene
We then have
which is equal to V * 0 (K, D, η) by Proposition 2. For xed K the combined objective in (3.10) is convex in D. Hence,U * 0 (K, D, η) is obtained as a pointwise maximum over an innite set of convex functionals, which shows that U * 0 (K, D, η) is convex in D. A similar argument can be applied to show convexity in K.
An important dierence between the constraints of (3.3) and the no-arbitrage conditions A1-A6 is the fact that in the rst case we have ξ T ≥0, whereas in the second case the stricter ξ T > 0 is demanded. For η-arbitrage free markets the dual problem can be restated by using equivalent measures in the following way: can be calculated as
Proof. Starting from (3.3) the dual problem can be reformulated as
If the market is η-arbitrage free then by Lemma 2 the feasible set of (3.12) is not empty. Let ξ , λ , µ , ν be feasible for (3.12) and dene again
(3.14)
In addition, now set µ t = µ ξ and ν t = ν t ξ t .
(3.15)
Clearly we then have µ t ≥ 0 ν t ≥ 0. The arguments used in the proof of Proposition 1 can be applied again to derive the following dual feasibility conditions for λ, µ, ν together with and an equivalent measure Q with
Together with denitions (3.15) this fact can be used to reformulate the dual objective function as
Applying now (3.14) and the relation dQ dP = ξ T it is possible to reformulate the objective function again and one gets the reformulated dual sup Q,λ,µ,ν
If the market is η-arbitrage free we have V *
3.2. Superheding prices. We keep the basic setup for a producer with bounded storage and production. In order to nd a superhedging price ensuring that all contractual obligations can be fullled and the end wealth stays nonnegative, specication (3.1) is modied in the following way:
the objective now is to minimize the delivery price and the asset value starts at zero at time zero.
Again, in order to analyze (3.16) we use the related dual representation. Proposition 3. The Lagrange dual of the pricing problem (3.16) is given by 17) subject to
. . , T − 1, and RE
where for each t = 1, . . . , T the random variables ξ t ,λ t , µ t and ν t are essentially bounded and measurable w.r.t. F t . If the market is η-arbitrage free then
Proof. The Lagrangian of (3.17) is L(y, z, c, s; ξ, λ, ζ, µ, ν) = (3.20)
where ζ ≥ 0 is an essentially bounded F T -measurable random variable, and ξ t , λ t , µ t ≥ 0, ν t ≥ 0 are chosen F t -measurable and essentially bounded.
After reordering (3.20) yields L(y, z, c, s; ξ, λ, ζ, γ) = (3.22) The Lagrange dual problem then can be derived as max ξ,λ,µ,ν
where the constraints ensure that the Lagrange function
L(y, z, c, s; ξ, λ, ζ, γ)
stays bounded.
Constraint groups 3-6 of (3.24) already coincide with constraint groups 2-5 of (3.3). Using ξ T = ζ ≥ 0 we can eliminate ζ which leads to ξ T ≥ 0 and λ T + ν T ≥ X f T · ξ T from the rst line of constraints of (3.17) . This resembles the rst line of constraints in (3.17) . Finally, the second constraint of (3.24) can be reformulated as
Taking into account ν t ≥ 0 shows that this constraint is superuous. Altogether we have the dual (3.24). Now, because of R > 0 and RE P [ξ 1 ] = γ the γ is nonnegative. Moreover, γ = 0 implies E P [ξ 1 ] = 0 and hence ξ 1 = 0 with probability one, which (using the second constraint and ξ t ≥ 0) implies ξ t = 0 a.s. for all t. This contradicts
and hence we can concludeγ > 0. If the market is η-arbitrage free, conditions A1-A6 dene a nonempty set of processes ξ, λ. Multiplying all equations and inequalities by γ > 0, one sees that the reskaled processes κξ, κλ fulll A1-A6 but with RE
Because it is always feasible to increase µ t and ν t , it follows that the relative interior of the feasible set of (3.24) is not empty. This implies strong duality.
From the dual problem one sees that the minimum delivery price can be obtained by applying the stochastic discount factor process ξ to the process of opportunity costs, the revenues from selling the contractual delivery amounts at the electricity spot market. The resulting expected present value is augmented by a valuation for the eects of restricted production and storage.
There is also a decomposition into expected present values and risk premia.
Corollary 7. If a market X e t , X f t is η-arbitrage free, and given the stochastic discount factors ξ, λ, µ, ν and γ, the superhedging price can be decomposed into
Proof. Again, this is a straightforward application of Cov(X, Y ) = E
The interpretation of the stochastic discount factor ξ in Proposition (3) is quite dierent from the interpretation of ξ in the case of superhedging. While E [ξ t ] = 1 R t for valuations, this is not true in Proposition (3) . Instead, ξ is normalized to ensure Corollary 8. The dual problem (3.17) is equivalent to the fractional optimization problem 27) subject to
Proof. Suppose ξ , λ , µ , ν and γ fulll the constraints of the dual problem (3.17) . Dene
Dividing all constraints of the dual (3.17) by γ and using the rescaled variables ξ, λ, µ, ν, one gets the constraints of (3.27) plus the constraint
On the other hand, the dual objective function can be rewritten with scaled multiplicators:
Substituting γ from (3.28) into (3.29) leads to the objective of (3.27).
3.3. Capital Requirement and Acceptability pricing. Superhedging-based approaches lead to price bounds for delivery contracts, comparable with the rough no-arbitrage bounds for options.
The related strategy is riskless from the producer's perspective but can be very expensive from the customer's point of view. Usually the contract can not be sold a tthe superhedging price. For a reasonable price (or value) the producer denitely has to take some risk.
In the following we consider a producer who deviates from complete superhedging but nevertheless wants to control the risk: instead of aiming at an almost surely nonnegative value of the strategy at the end, the producer accepts some risk but bounds the acceptability of the nal wealth distribution. In terms of optimization, he replaces the third constraint group of the original problem (3.1) (or the fourth of (3.16)) by a constraint
where A denotes an acceptability functional which maps integrable random variables to the real line and α is a real number. In the following we analyze the two main issues, valuation and pricing in this new context. If we search for the smallest capital such that (3.30) holds together with the production and trading constraints of (3.1), this is the problem of acceptability valuation (capital requirement). If we search instead for the minimum delivery price, using (3.30) within (3.16), we call this an acceptability pricing problem.
Acceptability valuation and pricing in the strict sense aim at the case α = 0. This is a relaxation of the superhedging problem, hence leads to smaller feasible capital values and prices. However, α = 0 may also be a sensible choice in certain situations. In particular, electricity producers often optimize their production and trading activities. See e.g. [24, 23, 25, 22] for stochastic optimization models and surveys. Such a producer therefore is able to maximize the acceptability of his portfolio without the contract and then to calculate a capital requirement or acceptability price for the new contract (keeping all existing production and trading possibilities) with an acceptability not below the optimal value, calculated previously. This idea is often called indierence pricing (see [5, 19] for the general idea, and [15, 1] for some applications to electricity production and trading).
Dierent notions of acceptability exist in the literature. In the following we use acceptability functionals and mappings (see e.g. [20] }), also known as monetary utility functions (e.g. [13] ).
Acceptability functionals are mappings A : Ξ ⊆ L 1 (Ω, F, P) → R (where Ξ is a subspace), satisfying the following properties
It should be kept in mind that -up to sign -such functionals are identical with convex risk measures, e.g. [11] . For simplicity we restrict the analysis to positive homogeneous functionals centered at zero, i.e.
• (MA4) If X ∈ L 1 (Ω, F, P) and a ∈ R ≥ 0 then A(aX) = aA(X).
• (MA5) A(0) = 0
Recall that any positive homogeneous acceptability functional functional A on Ξ can be rewritten in terms of the conjugate representation We denote the set of stochastic processes fullling A1-A5 by A, which is nonempty if the market is η-arbitrage free. Based on the above setup, capital requirements calculated by acceptability valuation lead to the following modication of the superhedging results: Proposition 4. Consider an acceptability valuation problem based on a positive homogeneous acceptability functional A with conjugate representation (3.31) and β = 1 R T . The dual problem is
If the market X Proof. Dene a generalized Lagrangian of (3.1) by
where κ ≥ 0 is a real number, ζ = κζ for some ζ ∈ Υ A , and the processes ξ t , λ t , µ t ≥ 0, ν t ≥ 0 are adapted and essentially bounded. Recall that ζ is the (attained) minimizer in ( 
Ensuring boundedness, the Lagrange dual then is given by max ξ,ζ,κ,λ,µ,ν
R T (which follows from translation equivariance of A) and
R T , hence κ = 1 and therefore ξ T = ζ ∈ Υ A . The same arguments as at the end of the proof for Lemma 3 then lead to (3.32).
If Υ A ∩ A = ∅, then the arguments of Corollary 4 can be used to show that the relative interior of the feasible set is nonempty and strong duality follows.
Furthermore, it becomes apparent that acceptability valuation can be considered as a transfer of the idea of good deal bounds to energy markets. Good-deal bounds were used in several papers for pricing of standard nancial contracts at incomplete markets. The upper bound is given by the maximum contract price using positive stochastic discount factors that price the basic assets (which leads to the no-arbitrage bound) and fulll some additional restrictions. A special case with a restriction on the variance of discount factors was derived as the dual of minimizing the variance of discount factors that correctly price a set of assets in [12] . [6] proposes good deal bounds as a general method for pricing at incomplete markets and also coined the term. Dierent restrictions on the discount factors were proposed e.g. in [3] . In the present context of electricity markets with production, the problem of acceptability valuation leads to an upper good deal bounds with the appropriate no-arbitrage conditions and a restriction on the stochastic discount factord which is derived from the used acceptability functional.
Acceptability pricing can be treated in the same way.
Proposition 5. Consider an acceptability pricing problem based on a positive homogeneous acceptability functional A with conjugate representation (3.31) and β = 1 R T . The dual problem is
If Υ A ∩ A = ∅, then the minimum upfront payment based on acceptability pricing,
equals the optimal dual value G * 0 (K, D, η).
Proof. Dening a generalized Lagrangian like in the proof of proposition 4 leads to the dual problem max ξ,λ,µ,ν
(t ∈ T ) : ζ ≥ 0, µ t ≥ 0, ν t ≥ 0.
Using E P [ξ t ] = γ R t , we then can conclude
hence κ = γ and therefore ξ T = γζ . Again, it can be shown that γ > 0. The further arguments of the proofs for propositions 8 and 4 then can be applied in a direct way to derive (3.38) and the further statement of the current proposition.
Proposition also (5) implies a fractional representaion. The proof repeats the arguments of Corollary (8).
Corollary 9. The dual problem (3.17) is equivalent to the fractional optimization problem (t ∈ T 0 ) :
Interpreting propositions 4 and 5 one can see that compared to superhedging, acceptability values and prices show two eects: The acceptability restriction ξ T ∈ Υ A restricts the dual feasible set anddecreases the capital requirement or acceptability price. On the other hand α goes into the objective function and increases the value or price, hence can be interpreted as a premium for unhedged risk.
Remark 3. We assumed that the producer starts with zero capital at the beginning. This expresses the view that the producer does not relate any risk capital to the analyzed delivery contract.
However, in many situations risk capital is assigned either by internal risk management or because of regulatory requirements. Furthermore, [19] uses initial capital for indierence pricing, which expresses the view that the nancial position of a planner inuences the feasible prices. In the current framework, initial capital E 0 leads to the slight modication that the objective function in (3.38) is augmented by E 0 . (8), (4) and (5) have to be reformulated with η = η max . Moreover, each expression T −1 t=0 E P [µ t P t ] in the respective objective functions has to be replaced with
where P i t denotes the production restriction of generator i and µ i is the related process of (essentially bounded) shadow prices.
Conclusion
The paper at hand analyzes basic dierences regarding the characterization of arbitrage and the prizing of OTC contracts between electricity markets and nancial markets, using tools from convex analysis and duality theory in a stochastic optimization framework. While keeping a fundamentally nancial view, it accounts for typical frictions like storage restrictions, production eciency and asymmetric production possibilities that are important for energy markets but not relevant for nancial markets.
Arbitrage (more precisely: η-arbitrage) can be characterized by the feasibility of an equation system ensuring consistency between fuel and electricity prices and the possibilities of storage, cash accumulation and production. While this characterizing equations can be stated in terms of equivalent measures, the existence of equivalent martingale measures are neither a necessary nor a sucient condition like in the classical nancial results.
We also derived (dual) optimization problems,based on stochastic discount factors, for superhedging values and prices. The feasible discount factors are restricted by those discount factors consistent with no-arbitrage. Moreover the objective contains terms that give a value to the maximum sizes of storage and production. All kinds of contango and backwardation can be obtained in this way.
Finally, we considered capital requirements and acceptability prices, where the acceptability of the wealth distribution at the end was measured by concave, positive homogeneous acceptability functionals. It shows that the dual representation of those quantities is quite similar to the superhedging quantities, but that the set of feasible discount factors has to be restricted even further.
While those results show the similarities and dissimilarities between nancial and energy markets quite well, further frictions like storage costs, the usage of several fuels and production dependent eciencies will be considered in future research.
